

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK KENNEDY

FROM: Peter Rodman *PR*

THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN
congressional equity

Attached is the public record on Cienfuegos. It includes:

USG Statements

Tab A: HAK Chicago Backgrounder, September 16
Tab B: Friedheim Announcement, September 25 (notes)
Tab C: HAK Trip Backgrounder, September 25


Press Comment

Tab D: C. L. Sulzberger, September 25
Tab E: R. D. Heintz, September 28
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EXCERPT FROM KISSINGER BACKGROUNDER, CHICAGO, SEPT. 16, 1970

MR. TODD: Bill Todd, Rockford Star. Dr. Kissinger, speaking of off shore islands, and closer to home, I saw a report recently that the Soviet Union seems to be sneaking into Cuba. Is there anything to that report, and if so, how serious does the administration view it?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviet Union, of course, is very heavily established in Cuba as it is. It spends about \$1 million a day there, just to keep the island's economy going. What the reports are probably referring to, the reports that you mention, is the visit of the fleet units of the Soviet Union.

That in itself is not inconsistent with any understanding we have, certainly not against the letter. If they start operating strategic forces out of Cuba, say Polaris type submarines and use that as a depot, that would be a matter we would study very carefully.

What the Soviet Union has to decide is this: Really, the principles that Joe Sisco advanced for a Middle East settlement apply to us too. As you look around the world, both sides, simply by the logic of events, have innumerable opportunities to take small gains and to harass the other, or they can ask themselves what is required for a more permanent settlement? In which case, they have to forgo some tactical advantages for the sake of an agreeable atmosphere.

For example, if we put the Polaris submarine into the Black Sea, we have every right to do it. There are many newspapers who would say that is a provocative thing to do. Why operate so close to the Soviet border?

I am not saying everyone would hold that view. If one significantly changes the deployment of one's strategic forces, that is something the other side is bound to notice.

Therefore, both sides have to decide whether they want to restrain measures which they have a legal right to take, in the interest of some longer term settlements, or whether they want to press every advantage they have a legal right to take.

We are watching these events in Cuba and it isn't yet clear what, exactly, the Soviet Union is doing there. The fleet is rotating in and out, and we are watching events very carefully.

Mr. Friedheim made these general points in response to press queries at 12:30 p.m., Friday, September 25, 1970.

(This is not a verbatim transcript, and must not be used as direct quotes. The paper is prepared from notes which contain the sense of the answers only.)

We have had several queries during recent days and today concerning what the Soviets are doing in Cienfuegos. Also, if their activities had anything to do with submarines.

We know that Soviet ships and aircraft have made several visits to Cienfuegos in the past few months. There have been three Soviet Fleet visits to Cuba in the last year -- July/August 1969, May/June 1970, and this month.

We are keeping a close watch on the current Soviet activities. They are under close surveillance.

As you know, in Mr. Henkin's speech last Monday he said that the Soviet Union is demonstrating an apparent intention to achieve a capability for sustained surface and submarine operations in the Caribbean, close by our shores.

We have seen the printed reports that the Soviets are conducting activities in Cienfuegos in association with a submarine base. There are some new naval facilities in the Cienfuegos area within the past several months. Some of the Soviet support ships have visited there. There are no submarines there at the present time.

We do not know exactly what the facilities are intended to be nor whether they are intended to be bases. We are not sure that they are building a submarine support facility.

We fly U-2 flights and still do.

The LST we have talked about in recent weeks carried three barges which were offloaded, possibly at Havana, and towed, as you know, to Cienfuegos. We listed for you yesterday the ships in Cienfuegos.

We are following very closely these developments, but we can't be sure yet what they are intended to be.





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B A C K G R O U N D B R I E F I N G
(Soviet Presence in Cuba)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

3:20 P.M. EDT.

FRIDAY

SEPTEMBER 25, 1970

Q To what extent -- combining that with the missile violations, the general build-up in the Mediterranean by the Soviets and this announcement today that possibly they are building a submarine base in Cuba -- are we fearful generally at this time of Russian military activity increasing around the globe and, if so, is the President's trip at all related to these Russian actions?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the President's trip was basically planned before these actions occurred. It was planned after the cease fire and these violations began to be obvious, but before they became acute.

The reasons for the Presidential trip I have essentially indicated.

As for the events that you have mentioned, they are, of course, matters which we have to look at with concern.

With respect to the Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean, we are, of course, watching the development of Soviet naval activity and of possible construction there. We are watching it very closely. The Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness.

I would like perhaps to call attention to a press conference statement that President Kennedy made on November 20, 1962, in which he said the following:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean."

The operative part, of course, is here: "If all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future."

This, of course, remains the policy of this Government.

MORE

- 2 -

Q Does that imply that a submarine with missiles aboard would be carrying offensive weapons and therefore ---

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go any further than what I have said. And I have related it to the reports to which my attention was called about the possible construction of a naval base. All I want to point out is that we are watching it and we want to see for what type of weapons it would be suitable, and similar matters.

I have stated our general view with respect to it while the activity is now in an early stage.

Q Do I understand that there is some doubt that this base could accommodate Polaris Submarines?

DR. KISSINGER: I will go no further than what I have said. Obviously, a Polaris type submarine is an offensive weapon.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with the thesis that now the Russians are achieving parity in the military force with the United States around the world and also in the Mediterranean, that this will lead to peace?

DR. KISSINGER: We have trouble enough worrying about our side of the military equation. Our concern, our belief, our policy is to maintain a military establishment on the basis of the doctrine of sufficiency, and we believe that in the field of strategic weapons this is adequate to achieve the security and foreign policy objectives of the United States.

We do hope and we have made it clear to the Soviet Union in many exchanges, and we have done so in the SALT negotiations, we do hope that the two superpowers recognize their special responsibility for maintaining the peace, and also the need to recognize that both sides must be willing to subordinate possible tactical advantages for the benefit of the greater interest of humanity in peace.

This is why some of the events to which the preceding question alluded require us to study Soviet actions with particular concern..

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Q Dr. Kissinger, with the possible establishment of Soviet submarine bases in Cuba, isn't this a bad time to be taking a foreign trip?

DR. KISSINGER: Let's be careful about what has been said. We are watching the events in Cuba. We are not at this moment in a position to say exactly what they mean. We will continue to observe them and at the right moment we will take the action that seems indicated. We are in excellent communication.. Nothing very rapid and dramatic is likely to occur, and we are going to be in very close touch with the situation.

END

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NEW YORK TIMES 25 SEPTEMBER 1970

Ugly Clouds in the South

By C. L. SULZBERGER

UNITED NATIONS, New York—As if the United States were not sufficiently beset by problems in Southwest and Southeast Asia, it is about to enter a new time of troubles in Latin America. Already two points of possible and probable danger are discernible.

The possible danger could come in that old familiar crisis area, Cuba, where reports that a Soviet submarine base is under construction are being quietly investigated. It must be stressed that there is not yet any confirmation of these reports.

Initial information suggests, however, that a naval installation is being built at Cienfuegos, on the southern coast, and that it is designed to service "Y" class submarines, Moscow's equivalent of the American Polaris-launching vessels.

In a sense, if proven, this would be the equivalent of installing land-based missiles as Russia attempted in 1962, then touching off a dramatic confrontation. However, there is a quintessential difference.

Were the U.S.S.R. to contemplate surprise attack against the U.S.A., its submarines could fire their missiles from the open seas. A Cuban base would therefore not materially change the prevailing situation. But any new facility, designed to improve offensive Soviet striking power, would not (if confirmed) be well-regarded.

The probable danger, although not military, could ultimately prove far more important. The great likelihood is that Senator Allende, a Marxist-Socialist, will be formally chosen Chile's President by Congress on October 24.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Dr. Allende may well lie low, stress his moderation and international respectability, and only perhaps proceed with more drastic aspects of a revolutionary program once his government is firmly established.

Yet there are signs that such logic may not prevail and that the Chilean Communist party, which dominates the Union Popular (a front that supports Allende) is already using tough intimidation tactics against its opposition.

The immediate objective of this tactic appears to be an effort to gain control of Chile's principal newspapers, television and radio stations prior to the electoral session of Congress. Anti-Communist journalists and commentators have been threatened with physical violence if they do not yield, and communications workers' groups are demanding "popular" control of mass media.

Many editors feel openly harrassed. The Union Popular (composed of Communists, Socialists and Radicals but primarily guided by the first) demands direction of facilities and wants its own members to be promoted to top positions.

Some organizations have already begun to cede to these pressures. The program director of one television channel, still officially under government supervision, has received so many personal threats that he has decided to leave the country and plans have already been made for Union Popular to take over.

Chile's largest afternoon paper will

soon be sold for a modest down payment to a group believed to be representing the popular front. Last week the owner told his staff he had been warned that the paper would be taken over by a workers' cooperative if it did not switch its support to Dr. Allende.

Both he and the owners of El Mercurio, the leading conservative daily, have been menaced. El Mercurio, strongly opposed to Union Popular, belongs to a very wealthy family with widespread investments and which has long been engaged in a feud with Dr. Allende. The paper's staff indicates a fear it will be taken over by a cooperative dominated by Communists and even more extreme Popular Action groups.

The role of the press in South American ideological turnovers is seen as crucial by a hemisphere which remembers Perón's seizure of the principal Argentinian newspapers as a major move to consolidate his power. What now happens to Chile's freedom of expression will be a striking indication of Dr. Allende's ultimate intentions.

There is slight doubt that a strongly anti-U.S. regime is about to take over in Chile and it could well be tempted to employ totalitarian methods to achieve its aims. The consequences, as reflected in neighboring countries like Bolivia and Peru, are unpredictable.

But what can be predicted is an era of growing difficulty in relations between Washington and some of its southern neighbors. If a legally installed hostile regime in Chile were even inferentially backed up by any kind of Soviet military installation in Cuba, the entire effort to arrange a global detente between Washington and Moscow could be jeopardized.



DETROIT NEWS - 28 SEPTEMBER 1970 (2 OCTOBER)

Soviet sub base--new, graver Cuba crisis for U.S.

By COL. R. D. HEINL JR.
News Military Analyst

WASHINGTON—Russian establishment of a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba confronts the United States with the gravest Communist challenge since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In terms of U.S. vital interests — the security of continental United States, the security and inviolability of the Western Hemisphere, the essentiality of unthreatened lines of communication through the Caribbean — the presence of an unfriendly naval base (especially for missile submarines) in Cuba represents a more frontally dangerous and brutal Russian provocation than Nikita Khrushchev's installation there of medium-range ballistic missiles in 1962.

This naked thrust of Russian seapower and nuclear missile power into what has been an American lake comes against the backdrop of two other truculent and conspicuous exercises of Soviet military muscle at American expense during the last two months:

Russian deployment in August of SAM-2 and SAM-3 surface-to-air missiles into the Suez cease-fire zone (after having lied to the United States in the bargain) is one.

The other, of course, was the unleashing of Syria's 300 Russian-made T-54 and T-55 tanks in an attack on Jordan, our nearest Arab ally.

In direct implications for the security of the United States, neither of the foregoing (nor Russia's brutalization of Czechoslovakia, for that matter) approaches the Cienfuegos submarine base by several orders of magnitude.

The Russians only three months ago opened a new "Y a n k e e" class missile-submarine station off Greenland. ("Yankee" is the designation for Russia's Polaris-type submarine which they are now building at the rate of one a month. We have not built a Polaris submarine since 1966.)

When their Cuban base is complete and operational, the Soviets will have still another Yankee missile submarine station, this one in the Caribbean underbelly, able not only to reach targets throughout our South, Southwest and Midwest, but, also the Panama Canal and

much of South and Central America.

Incidentally, nuclear missiles fired against the United States from a Caribbean launching area would of course outflank our multibillion dollar landlocked anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses sitting in Montana and Dakota wheat fields, and again raise the question — somewhat more urgently now — as to why we do not immediately put part of our ABM defense at sea in the Navy's mobile SABMIS system that the Pentagon has stifled for several years.

But the threat of Russian submarines in Cienfuegos is by no means limited to that posed by Yankee-class boats, deadly as they are.

The Caribbean is our principal highway for transportation of South American strategic raw materials to the United States, which is no longer the plentifully endowed mountain of natural resources and raw materials it was even 30 years ago.

The Caribbean also is the Atlantic approach to the Panama Canal and the route that tankers must traverse to move Venezuelan oil to the United States and Europe.

Those old enough to remember World War II will never forget the fiery carnival of blazing tankers and torpedoed merchantmen that a relatively few German submarines were able to produce in the Caribbean and its Atlantic gateway, the Windward Passage between Cuba and Hispaniola.

With no Western Hemisphere base (such as the Russians are now building at Cienfuegos), German submarines in 1942 sank 285 American merchant ships in the Windward Passage alone.

The submarine threat to our Caribbean communications was so great between 1942 and 1945 that the U.S. Navy had to convoy more ships through the Windward Passage than through any other sea area except the approaches to New York.

Because of the sickness of our democratic society at war with itself, our New Left, peace-at-any-price Senate, our war-weariness and neo-isolationism, we may except that the direness of the Cienfuegos development will be minimized and at first even denied, as with the Suez missile cheating and lies

by the Russians.

For public consumption, Pentagon spokesmen are saying "we are not sure" what is developing at Cienfuegos. Others are saying, well, there aren't any of the Yankee submarines there — yet. Still others, apologetic, are already laying out the fallback line: How can we blame the Russians for this while we have Polaris submarine bases in Scotland (Holy Loch) and Spain (Rota)?

One short answer to the latter question is that Holy Loch and Rota are a thousand miles from metropolitan Russia while Cienfuegos is 150 miles from the United States.

The pretense that our intelligence and reconnaissance machinery isn't "sure" what it is happening at Cienfuegos is misleading rubbish. It can be stated on high authority that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a disturbingly clear picture of what the Russians are up to and are deeply concerned as to what, if anything, we can do about it.

Once and for all, as we ought to have learned from 1962 if nothing else, the only thing the Russians respect is power.

In the Cuban missile crisis, we had, depending on how one recognized it, strategic missile superiority of anywhere from 5-1 to 10-1 over Russia.

Today, due to Robert S. McNamara's hideous misjudgment of the 1960's, the Soviets have more ICBM's than we have. At the time of Cuba in 1962, we had a fighting Navy in its prime and Russia had virtually no Navy at all. Today the new, tough Russian fleet cruises the Gulf of Mexico thumbing its nose at our over-age, rust-bucket fleet with no surface-to-surface missiles at all, the World War II submarines such as Russia junked a decade ago.

To expel Russian missiles from Cuba in 1962, President Kennedy had to go to a general mobilization and point every one of our nuclear weapons down Khrushchev's throat.

In 1970, since it appears we have neither the heart nor any longer the strength to do what Kennedy did, the country may have to reconcile itself to living with Russian submarines and their nuclear missiles targeted at our cities from a base on what we once called an American lake.



NEW YORK TIMES
30 SEPTEMBER 70 P6
**WARNING ON CUBA
PUZZLES U.S. AIDES**

**White House Data in Report
on Base Termed Old**

By TAD AZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 —

American officials said today that the United States had only dubious and dated information to indicate that the Soviet Union might be planning to build a strategic submarine base in Cuba.

For this reason, these officials, who include members of the intelligence community, said they were at a loss to explain why the White House chose last week to warn Moscow against the establishment of such a base.

Officials and diplomats have suggested the possibility that the White House acted for broader policy motivations including the Middle East crises, or that an alleged Soviet threat in Cuba was being used to signal dangers that might develop if Dr. Salvador Allende, a Marxist, became Chile's President in November as expected.

The whole question of the reported Soviet plans for a naval base is delicate because in the Administration are inhibited from commenting on background briefings by the White House.

Source of Embarrassment

The practice of background briefings, by officials who cannot be publicly identified, has often turned into a source of embarrassment to the State Department.

While Latin-American diplomats wondered why the United States chose to create at this time what appeared to be an artificial crisis in the Caribbean, American officials acknowledged that the unconfirmed reports of construction of a Soviet base in the Cuban port of Cienfuegos had been available since early this year.

The officials said that little

if any, new information had been obtained in recent months that would account for the warning on Friday that "the Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness."

Hearings Are Recalled

It was recalled that virtually all the information on the reported Cuban base had been presented to the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs during hearings between July 8 and Aug. 3.

The possibility that the Soviet Union might seek to build a base was raised in the closed-door hearings by Adm. E. P. Holmes, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and by G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Mr. Nutter's remark that the establishment of a Soviet base "cannot be discounted as long as Castro's hostility to the United States persists" was partly deleted from the transcript for security reasons. But no witness reported actual evidence of base construction.

Officials said there was still no evidence of suspicious construction activities, despite flights by U-2 surveillance planes.

However, reports from refugees from Cuba indicated that a section of Cienfuegos Harbor had been closed to visitors, except Soviet personnel.

In what may be a related effort, the Cuban press agency Prensa Latina reported Sept. 17 that an eight-lane highway from Havana to Cienfuegos, a section of the new southern coast superhighway, was being built under the supervision of a Soviet engineer.

Officials commented that normal automotive traffic in Cuba did not seem to justify an eight-lane highway, unless it was intended for military use.

These were the possible explanations offered for the White House response to these reports:

(More)

Continuation of Ted Sauter Article

Excerpt from NYT ticker tape article on Cuba naval construction.

These were the possible explanations offered for the White House response to these reports:

The White House may have wished to relate, for the benefit of American public opinion, the dangers inherent in Communist Cuba with the dangers in Chile if Allende is confirmed by the Chilean Congress as President. It may have wished to impress upon Moscow the U.S. determination to discourage further Soviet naval activities. Soviet war ships have been increasingly active in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. Officials said the public warning had not been followed up by any diplomatic communications to Moscow. They said also that no meeting had been held on the subject in the State Department. The Administration may have wished to emphasize the dangers of a Soviet naval buildup to persuade Congress to authorize additional defense funds. The House Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee plans to hold a closed hearing tomorrow with Defense intelligence officials to ascertain what information is available on the reported base construction.



WASHINGTON STAR 30 September 1970 P3

U.S. Warning on Cuba Subs Linked to Sightings by U2s

By ORR KELLY

Star Staff Writer

The White House issued its stern warning to the Soviet Union about establishing a strategic base in Cuba because equipment associated with the Russian Yankee class nuclear missile submarine was being installed at Cienfuegos, on the south shore of Cuba, according to informed sources.

Pictures taken by high flying U2 airplanes reportedly show the Russians installing a more elaborate shore-based station than that used in support of the American Polaris submarines.

Almost all the support for Polaris submarines at such stations as Holy Loch, Scotland, is provided by a floating drydock and a special submarine tender equipped with cranes to lift missiles out of the submarine and set them back down in special holders in the tender.

Same Setup in Cuba

The evidence now available here reportedly shows a shore station being set up at Cienfuegos to provide the same kind of support for the Yankee class submarines.

Because the Russians maintain submarines on station off the American Atlantic Coast and could support them from floating submarine tenders, the apparent intention to establish a permanent shore installation seems to U.S. officials to be more provocative, especially since it comes in the midst of the strategic arms limitations talks.

Public statements by U.S. officials indicate that work on a Yankee class submarine base

began—or at least was discovered—quite recently, since the arms talks recessed in midsummer.

The establishment of a submarine base in the Western Hemisphere, either with a shore station or supported by a tender, has certain advantages.

A base in Cuba will permit the Russians to keep more submarines on station or to get by with fewer boats and to operate them more easily close to U.S. shores. In this sense, the establishment of a base may be a simple matter of economy.

A base close to the continental United States may also require the American Navy to spend more money and use more manpower to keep track of the potentially hostile submarines.

Such a base could permit the Soviet submarine force to get into position quickly for a surprise attack on the United States.

Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said in a speech Monday that, "We must take every diplomatic, and, if necessary, military step to excise this cancer from the body of the Western Hemisphere."

The diplomatic effort apparently had begun Friday when a White House official told reporters the United States views the establishment of a strategic base "with the utmost seriousness."

There is no indication so far, however, that the administration is considering the use of anything as drastic as military action against the base.

WASHINGTON STAR 30 SEPT 1970 (10CT 1970) P-3

A-Sub Equipment Installed In Cuba, New Data Shows

By ORR KELLY

Star Staff Writer

Equipment specifically associated with the new Yankee class Soviet nuclear missile submarine is being installed at Cienfuegos on the south shore of Cuba, according to informed sources.

This specific information, which goes well beyond the guarded references to possible construction made by the Pentagon and White House on Friday, led to the stern warning by the White House to the Soviet Union that the installation of a strategic base in this hemisphere would be viewed with the utmost seriousness by the United States.

The Yankee class submarine, which is very similar to the American Polaris, is designed to deliver nuclear-tipped missiles and is considered a strategic weapon, like an intercontinental ballistic missile, rather than a tactical weapon, such as an attack submarine.

Pictures taken by high flying U2 airplanes reportedly show the Russians installing a more elaborate shore-based station

than that used in support of the American Polaris submarines.

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The firm information that led to the White House warning apparently became available only during the last two weeks of September since the recess of the strategic arms limitations

talks and more than a month and a half after the conclusion of hearings on Cuba and the Caribbean by the House subcommittee on inter-American affairs.

'Significant Development'

On Sept. 2, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told newsmen a Soviet task force of five vessels was moving toward the Caribbean. Without saying why, Laird described the movement of the task force as "significant development."

On Sept. 14, Pentagon press spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim mentioned for the first time publicly that three barges were being towed toward Cienfuegos by two of the Soviet vessels.

Two days later, a high-ranking Nixon administration official, speaking to a group of editors in Chicago, mentioned the Soviet fleet visits and made a careful distinction between them and the operation of Polaris-type submarines out of the Cuban depot.

The United States, he said, would study that very carefully.

Meaning Overlooked

Although the significance of his words was overlooked when

the transcript of the briefing was made public, it is now obvious that the start of construction at Cienfuegos was what he had in mind.

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
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The diplomatic effort apparently had begun Friday when a White House official told reporters the United States views the establishment of a strategic base "with the utmost seriousness."



WASHINGTON POST - 1 OCTOBER 1970 P-15

Remarks on Cuba Base Reflect Worry About Soviets

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

Almost lost in the Middle East crisis was last Friday's seeming one-day wonder: a tough American warning to the Soviet Union about the possible construction by the Russians of a strategic base in Cuba.

Yet the Cuban affair does bear a close relationship to the Middle East, specifically to Moscow's role there, and to such other Soviet-American points of interest as Berlin and the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

The timing involved in what was said last Friday is of more than passing interest. Hints of the possibility that the Soviets planned to build a naval base at Cienfuegos on Cuba's south shore first appeared in print as far back as several weeks. The Economist of London, for instance, ran such a report in its Sept. 19 issue.

Pentagon reporters began asking for information. A column Friday morning in the New York Times by C. L. Sulzberger, stating that reports of a base under construction were being investigated, added to the pressure. The Pentagon then told newsmen that three Soviet ships had moved three heavy barges and other equipment into Cienfuegos harbor in the past few weeks.

This, said spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim, "makes us feel that they may be seeking sustained capabilities in the area." He added that the Pentagon was "not sure that they are building a submarine port facility."

Such statements, on top of Pentagon reports of Soviet fleet activities of late in the Atlantic and Caribbean areas, would be enough to worry military hawks in Washington but hardly enough to do more than bolster Navy claims for more money from Congress.

Yet at 3:20 that Friday afternoon, during the course of a briefing in the White House East Room on President Nixon's then impending European trip, the Cuban base issue was drastically escalated.

It should be said here that up to that hour no general alarm bells had been rung within the Nixon administration, according to several specialists whose duty is to follow such matters. Indeed, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs still claims it knows nothing about Cienfuegos since that is the responsibility of officials han-

dling Soviet affairs.

Yet when the White House briefers, who may not be named but who this time was allowed to be directly quoted to add emphasis, was asked about the reports, he had in hand a statement made by President Kennedy at the close of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

As has been reported, the White House official, as he may be designated, stated that "the Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness."

He called attention to the Kennedy statement that there would be peace in the Caribbean "if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future."

That, he added, of course remains the policy of this government. He avoided answering questions as to what was going on at Cienfuegos but he did say that "obviously, a Polaris-type submarine is an offensive weapon." The Soviets are building a fleet of such subs.

Finally, when pressed, the White House spokesman said:

"Let's be careful about what has been said. We are watching the events in Cuba. We are not at this moment in a position to say exactly what they mean. We will continue to observe them and at the right moment we will take the action that seems indicated."

That latter phrase, coupled with the "utmost seriousness" reference earlier, constituted a startling escalation of verbiage. It amounted to an American threat to forcibly prevent the use of Cienfuegos as a Soviet base for missile submarines, a threat of a nature not uttered by Washington to Moscow since the Cuban crisis eight years ago.

In retrospect, there are two lines of explanation now heard in Washington.

One is political. The White House appears to have begun to feel the vice of the Soviet-Kennedy feud. It is said, this is a reference to the former Republican senator from New York, now the U.S. ambassador to India, who in 1962 annoyed and embarrassed the Kennedy administration with repeated statements that the Soviet Union was employing missiles in Cuba, long before the President confirmed that act. Of course, 1962, like 1970, was a congressional election year. The other explanation is

more substantive and a clue to it can be found in other remarks by that same White House spokesman last Friday afternoon.

He said in response to a question: "We do hope and we have made it clear to the Soviet Union in many exchanges, and we have done so in the SALT negotiations, we do hope that the two superpowers recognize their special responsibility for tactical advantages for the benefit of the greater interest of humanity in peace."

In short, Cienfuegos could be a case of Moscow pressing Washington for tactical advantage in the arms race. The spokesman did not say so but he might well have added: just as they have done in cheating on the stand-still cease-fire in Egypt.

On Sept. 16 in Chicago the same spokesman had expressed puzzlement at that cheating and raised the question of whether it meant the Soviet Union was moving generally to a hard-line policy all across the board.

Thus as of now the general conclusion in Washington is that the surprising escalation of White House language over what is going on at Cienfuegos was less a function of that particular item than a reflection of a growing administration concern over Soviet policy in general.

As to Cienfuegos itself, military experts generally scoff at a comparison to the Cuban crisis of 1962. For one thing no missiles are being land-based. Submarine use of that port would ease Soviet crew and other problems and probably permit more ships to remain on station in the Atlantic. But it also would aid U.S. Navy tracking of such submarines, possibly a point of balancing value.

Soviet Union Scoffs At Reports on Cuba

By Harry Trimborn

Los Angeles Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 30—The Soviet Union today scoffed at reports it may be building a submarine base in Cuba, calling them a Nixon administration propaganda ploy to secure votes in the November election.

The official Communist Party newspaper Pravda declared that such reports were part of an effort to "treacherously fan the mili-

tary psychosis (in the United States) with the aid of hastily concocted inventions."

It was, said Pravda, a new "del. tough" propaganda campaign mounted by the administration to cover the bankruptcy of its own policies by raising "another racket of another 'Soviet threat' in Cuba, the Middle East and elsewhere.

The comments were the first Soviet public reaction to last week's reports from Washington of intelligence "indications" that a base capable of housing nuclear missile submarines was being built at Cienfuegos on the southern coast of Cuba.

Pravda did not mention specifically the reported submarine base construction. It referred only to reported Soviet "military movement" in Cuba and elsewhere. But there was little doubt that it had the reported base in mind.

"It is clear," said Pravda, "... that the racket about preparations in Cuba supposedly threatening the United States' security has been raised for perfectly definite purposes."

These purposes, said the newspaper, are aimed at creating "a favorable atmosphere for the elections to Congress and the United States President's visit to Europe."


The Soviet press has been attacking Mr. Nixon's journey as a "counter-revolutionary" demonstration of American military might.

The Pravda article linked this to what it charged was a Nixon administration effort to "create an atmosphere of military hysteria among ordinary Americans and exerting political pressure upon the capitals of some other capitalistic countries."

Pravda viewed this effort as an attempt to revive "the bad old times" of the cold war of the 1950s.

By reviving old anti-Soviet antagonisms, the Nixon administration hopes to gather votes among the nation's "silent majority, that is, from the right wing section of the electorate," Pravda said, adding:

There are also other reasons—"the forthcoming voting for military appropriations in Congress which preceded most successfully with the fair wind of the cold war."



UPI-63

(CJBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. BARRY M. GOLDWATER SAID TODAY HE FINDS EVIDENCE OF A SERIOUS RUSSIAN "BID FOR WORLD DOMINATION" IN THE WHITE HOUSE'S DISCLOSURE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE BUILDING A STRATEGIC SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA.

DEEP CONCERN WAS ALSO EXPRESSED BY SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD OF MONTANA.

"I DO VIEW IT WITH ALARM," MANSFIELD TOLD AN INTERVIEWER.

"IT RAISES THE MOST SERIOUS QUESTIONS," HE SAID, IN LIGHT OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'S STATEMENT AFTER THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS THAT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS MUST BE KEPT OUT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TO ASSURE "PEACE IN THE CARIBBEAN."

GOLDWATER SOUGHT TO ATTACH BLAME TO SENS. J. WILLIAMFULBRIGHT, D-ARK., AND GEORGE S. MCGOVERN, D-S.D., AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT FOR THE RUSSIANS' "BOLDNESS."

"I BELIEVE THE LEADERS IN THE KREMLIN HAVE BEEN LISTENING SERIOUSLY TO THE FULBRIGHTS AND THE MCGOVERNS AND THE PEACENIKS AND THE ADVOCATES OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND HAVE DECIDED THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO FIND OUT JUST HOW STRONG IS OUR DEDICATION TO FREEDOM AND OUR DETERMINATION TO DEFEND IT," THE ARIZONA REPUBLICAN SAID.

HE ADDED IN A STATEMENT ISSUED BY HIS OFFICE:

"THE CONSTRUCTION OF A STRATEGIC SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH CURRENT RUSSIAN MOVES AIMED AT SHIFTING THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER AWAY FROM THE UNITED STATES.

"THESE MOVES, COUPLED WITH SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND RUSSIAN-SUPPORTED MILITARY ACTIVITY IN INDOCHINA, ALL SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW ENGAGED IN ITS BOLDEST BID FOR WORLD DOMINATION SINCE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962."

MANSFIELD SAID HE WAS AWAITING FURTHER INFORMATION FROM THE WHITE HOUSE BEYOND FRIDAY'S STATEMENT BY AN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL WHO ASKED THAT HIS IDENTITY NOT BE REVEALED.

THE OFFICIAL TOLD REPORTERS OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATING THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE BUILDING A BASE FOR MISSILE-CARRYING SUBMARINES ON CUBA'S SOUTH COAST.

MANSFIELD NOTED THAT INTERNATIONAL LAW GIVES THE SOVIETS THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY THEIR SUBMARINES ANYWHERE ON THE HIGH SEAS BUT HE SAID CONSTRUCTION OF A CUBAN BASE FOR THEM WOULD "ADD A SERIOUS DIMENSION" TO AMERICAN DEFENSE PROBLEMS.

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ISSUES AND ANSWERS

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1979

GUEST:

SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chair of,
Committee on Foreign Relations

INTERVIEWED BY:

John Scali, ABC News Diplomatic Correspondent
Bob Clark, ABC News Capitol Hill Correspondent

- - -

MR. SCALI: Senator Fulbright, welcome to ISSUES AND
ANSWERS.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Thank you very much. I am
pleased to be here.

MR. SCALI: The Pentagon has disclosed that the Soviet
may be establishing a permanent submarine base on the Cuban
coast, and a White House official said yesterday before
before that he views this development with utmost seriousness.

move offensive missiles into the Western Hemisphere waters.

do you think the United States should do something to prevent the Soviets from setting up such a base?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't know what they could do other than diplomatic representations. I don't think they could take physical action very effectively. We have bases as you know, with nuclear weapons on the borders of Russia. This whole attitude of our exclusive right to patrol the world I think is coming under more serious criticism. I say two things about that. One is that nearly every year just before we have an appropriation bill in the Senate we get these stories, so it may or may not be true. I read the story in the paper. It isn't conclusive at all. They suspect something is going on at that base.

The other is the assumption that they have no right to be there. That is a very questionable proposition. In any case I think what is very much in order now is to pursue the talks at Vienna in the most serious manner and see if we can't really come to some conclusion with the Russians. If we do not and if we allow this thing to deteriorate, they will build bases and we will build bases until there are only will be a real confrontation.

MR. SCALI. Do you agree with the view expressed by the late President Kennedy that the way to preserve peace in the Caribbean is to keep Soviet offensive weapons out of the Caribbean?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I would like to keep them out of the Caribbean, and we succeeded in the former case, but much has happened since then. The relative strength of the two countries is very different, today. Nuclear strength, particularly. Very different. It was possible at that time to bluff them, I think. I doubt that it is possible now because the best information we have is there is a degree of parity. It is a dangerous situation.

This calls for diplomacy and not bluff and certainly not the resort to arms because this is a disaster. Surely everybody knows that now with nuclear weapons, and with Russia --

MR. CLARK: Senator Goldwater views the Russian move in the Caribbean as a move for world domination and partly blames you.

He stated yesterday, "I believe the leaders in the Kremlin have been listening seriously to the Fulbrights and the McGoverns and the Fedeunks and the advocates of unilateral disarmament and have decided now is the time to fight it out. It is our dedication to freedom and our determination to defend it."

Would you have anything to say in reply to that?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't know of anybody who

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There is nothing that would justify a statement that anybody is advocating that. There is certainly nothing to justify the implication that we are unilaterally disarming. We are spending more money than anybody on arms, today and have been. We spent over a thousand billion dollars on military affairs since World War II. That is a ridiculous statement, to make such an implication.

I don't advocate that. I do not believe that we can engage in this brinkmanship with nuclear weapons and succeed. I think the approach the Administration I thought was following and I hope they continue it and I have done everything I know to promote it, is the negotiations at the SALT talks for disarmament, the negotiations I hope will resume in the Middle East and the diplomatic negotiations for the Far East that is going on at Paris. At least the frame is set.

And now above all of that I would hope we would try to revive the influence of the UN and its activity, its commitment in those areas which I think it ought to be. This is the 25th anniversary of the UN. We ought to be making real serious efforts to implicate the Security Council in these matters.

MR. CLARK: Do you believe, Senator, whatever the Russians are trying to do in the Caribbean is a deliberate effort to test President Nixon, as some people believe that the Russians are trying to test our resolve in the Middle East

SENATOR FULLBRIGHT: That is a childish sort of --

schoolboyish way to look at it, testing each other. But we have the capacity for destruction. If we are the only power of Americans for many years as that we are the only power on the world and we have an exclusive right to keep open all the oceans of the world and that nobody else has, which we don't like it and they resent the Russians coming in the Mediterranean. The is as close to the question almost as the Caribbean is to us.

I don't think you can any longer entertain the idea that we have exclusive right to exclude Russia, major powers in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean. If you want to go in, go in it if you can, of course, but I don't advocate that. I think we have to seek ways of accommodating ourselves to these changed conditions, that is all. It is a sensible matter, for the long term security of the United States. I think the other way is a disastrous way. That is the way that was pursued in the past and we know what has happened in two world wars and a lot of minor ones in the last half century.

THE SOVIET THREAT

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. RIVERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, never before in the 30 years of my membership in this body have I stepped into the well of this House with greater concern for the future of this Nation.

The fears that I have are those that must be shared by every American regardless of his political or social philosophy or his economic status.

All Americans have been given the blessed and priceless heritage of freedom—a freedom which I am convinced is in terrible jeopardy.

My critics, who are legion, will attempt to dismiss what I say today by categorizing them as the shrill cries of a hawk who is suffering the agonies of reduced defense expenditures.

If this occurs, I will have failed my purpose since I believe that these critics, who love America no less than I, will, if they assess my words carefully, find that we not only have a common concern, but a common and frightening peril.

The Congress is now engaged in a great and protracted debate over foreign policy and the defense budget.

Unfortunately, the debate in the other body has again distinguished itself by its indecisiveness and, regrettably, its apparent sense of hopelessness. Thank God that this body, despite its uninhibited free swinging debate, continues to be capable of making clear-cut and courageous decisions when our Nation's security is at stake.

My words today are, therefore, intended as much for the Members of the

either body as they are for you and, perhaps even more importantly, they are intended for the American people. For in the last analysis, it is the American people who stand to lose everything if we fail to discharge our awesome responsibilities in respect to our national defense.

Consideration of the defense budget, contrary to what some would have us believe, is not a question of assigning relative priorities between defense and domestic programs.

Decisions on the defense budget should be based on the simple question of national survival—and nothing more.

The issue should be "what is required to survive?"; and not "how should we allocate the national budget between defense and domestic programs?"

The final measure of our ability to survive as a nation in a hostile world will not be how well we have managed our domestic resources and domestic programs, but whether or not we have avoided and frustrated the forces of evil which would draw us into the crucible of war with the Soviet Union.

If we fail in that endeavor, we will have failed in everything.

It is this circumstance which demands that we maintain a level of strategic and conventional military capability that will insure against any misunderstanding by the leaders in the Kremlin of our intentions to survive.

Regrettably, the leaders in the Kremlin are now evidently unimpressed by both our military capability and our national determination to survive.

That our determination to survive is suspect requires no elaboration. The dissident voices in our Nation who would destroy the very fabric of our society are being interpreted by the leaders in the Kremlin as the voices of the American people. This fact together with our evident unwillingness to support a defense establishment geared to national survival has created a very dangerous atmosphere in which the Soviet Union may be tempted into actions which can only ultimately result in a nuclear holocaust.

Since the deterioration of our military capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is no secret to the Kremlin, I believe it is high time that we tell the American people the facts of life. I plan on doing that today.

First, since we all recognize the vital importance of being a maritime nation, and because of our dependence on the free use of the seas, let me tell you some sobering facts about Soviet naval strength.

The Soviet Union is now one of the world's two leading sea powers—and possibly the leading power. When Admiral Gorshkov assumed command of the Navy in 1956, it was largely a water-borne adjunct of the ground forces. Today, it is a well balanced modern force which is equally at home on the high seas as it is in coastal waters.

Soviet naval units now frequent waters which only a few years ago were considered the private preserve of Western naval forces.

It was only in 1964 that the Soviet

Navy began continuous deployments in the Mediterranean; now, since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, a flotilla of nuclear submarines and missile-armed surface ships have been continuously operating there.

This Mediterranean presence has at times attained a flotilla strength of 65 naval vessels, including submarines and support ships.

As a consequence, today Soviet naval forces constitute a major political and military presence in the Mediterranean.

This naval presence has also been extended into the Indian Ocean, and the farthest reaches of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Soviet submarines and warships equipped with missiles now operate off the coast of the United States, as well as the Caribbean and off the coast of Africa and Southeast Asia.

The worldwide Soviet naval operation "Ocean" which was conducted during April of this year involved more than 200 ships and submarines, and was their announcement to the world that they have developed and intend to flex their naval muscle simultaneously in the four corners of the world.

The Soviet surface fleet now includes two helicopter carriers, about 24 cruisers, 35 guided missile destroyers, 50 gun-armed destroyers, more than 100 destroyer escorts, and literally thousands of smaller ships, minesweepers, coastal escorts, support craft, and intelligence collectors.

The greatest Soviet naval strength is in its submarine force—the largest ever created in the history of the world. The fleet presently has approximately 350 submarines, 80 of which are nuclear powered.

The new Soviet Polaris-type submarine can fire 16 ballistic missiles to a range of at least 1,300 miles; at least 13 units of this class are already operational, and these units are being produced at the rate of 8 to 10 each year. They are testing a new submarine ballistic missile estimated to have a range of 3,000 miles. This missile will probably be back fitted into the existing Soviet submarine fleet.

At the present rate of construction, the Soviet fleet of these Y-class ballistic missile submarines will surpass the U.S. fleet of 41 Polaris submarines by 1973 or 1974.

In addition to the Y-class ballistic missile submarine, the Soviet navy has approximately 40 older ballistic missile submarines which carry three launchers each. Nine of these submarines are nuclear powered, and are probably targeted against European or Asian targets, whereas the more modern Y-class missile submarines are, for the most part, targeted against the United States.

The Soviet Navy also has about 65 submarines, 35 of which are nuclear powered, equipped with supersonic cruise missiles, some having ranges up to 400 miles. These submarines are designed to attack both naval and merchant ships. In addition, the Soviet Union has about 240 other submarines which are designed for torpedo attack missions against surface ships or other submarines. Twenty-two of these are nuclear powered.

In evaluating the Soviet submarine

fleet, it must be remembered that the German submarine fleet which almost won the battle of the Atlantic, included only 57 diesel submarines in the early months of World War II.

The Soviet nuclear submarine construction capability now is about 20 units a year based on working one work shift a day; by working three shifts a day they have the ability to produce 35 nuclear submarines a year. Today they are building at a rate of from 10 to 14 per year. One Soviet yard alone has several times the area and facilities of all the U.S. submarine yards combined.

The Soviet Union is expanding its production of Y-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and I estimate that approximately 50 units of this new missile class will have been completed by as early as mid-1974.

By contrast to Soviet submarine strength, the United States today has only 147 operational submarines of which 83 are nuclear-powered, and of which only 47 are configured as submarines primarily designed to combat the Soviet submarine threat. The other 41 nuclears are our Polaris missile firing submarines.

Despite the 47 U.S. nuclear attack submarines designed and available to combat the Soviet submarine threat, the latest Soviet nuclear submarines have a submerged speed which is significantly higher than anything we previously contemplated or expected.

It is this chilling fact that has compelled the Committee on Armed Services to insist that we go forward immediately on the construction of the new nuclear-powered 683-class submarine which we hope will be able to cope with this significant and deadly Soviet capability. However, regardless of how rapidly we proceed on the construction of this new class of submarines, it will be years before they become operational in significant numbers, and in the meantime Soviet technology will undoubtedly strive to maximize this almost unbridgeable gap in our defensive response to this Soviet submarine threat.

This existing and ever-widening gap in our defensive capability to meet the Soviet submarine threat is simply a current reflection of the past unwillingness of defense budgeteers to provide for a modern Navy.

Practically every surface ship in the Soviet fleet has the Styx missile. Now for you who do not know what the Styx missile is, let me tell you a few shocking facts. This is a short-range naval missile which travels at approximately sonic speed and can be carried on almost the smallest type of naval craft. It has tremendous reliability and, most unfortunately, we have little in the way of a reliable defense against this type of missile attack.

These surface-to-surface missiles enable small torpedo boats to duel with cruisers and large combatant surface vessels by outranging the conventional naval artillery on these ships.

Unfortunately, we again do not have a missile of this capability in our own operational inventory.

The surface naval vessels of the United States are, as compared to the Soviet

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

September 28, 1970

Union, if anything, in worse condition than those of the undersea fleet. No purpose would be served in attempting to detail these deficiencies except to point out that the Comptroller General of the United States recently submitted a secret report to the President of the United States and the Congress on the impaired combat readiness of the Navy's Atlantic and 6th Fleets.

In that report, the Comptroller General in commenting on the readiness of these naval vessels stated, and I quote:

Approximately 80% of the major ships in the Atlantic Fleet are over ten years old, and 50% are over 20 years. In April 1969, the average age of the ships of the Sixth Fleet was 18.3 years.

The Comptroller General, in commenting on the relationship of the age of our naval vessels and their inability to maintain combat readiness pointed out that "prior to 1964 engineering casualties" represented approximately one-quarter of the circumstances which required immobilizing a ship, but because of the advancing age of the vessels "in 1964 the engineering casualties began to increase, and by the end of 1968, they accounted for about 50 percent of the total casualties."

The Comptroller General went on to say that—

This trend was evidence of the fact that the ship's platforms and associated propulsion systems were being affected by excessive age, plus a lack of parts for equipment, which in some instances, was no longer being manufactured.

The sum total of the General Accounting Office's secret report is that under current conditions fleet readiness for sustained wartime operations is:

At best, marginal due to the lack of qualified personnel, poor logistical support, and the need for modern ships. The fleets are capable of handling a contingency but are only marginally capable of maintaining a high level of sustained operations.

Without revealing information which would give aid and comfort to the Soviet Union, I also feel compelled to tell this House that not very long ago I was told that the combat condition of our cruisers and destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet was so bad, both from a materiel breakdown and personnel shortage viewpoint, that more than half of them were in a condition that would have seriously affected their combat capability. As a matter of fact, some of these ships could not have engaged in any kind of naval confrontation.

I cannot overemphasize the seriousness of this situation. Yet, I know that there are people in the Congress of the United States who will say "so what?" I can only warn the Members of this House that we are on the brink of disaster and I have never before been so concerned in all the years I have served in the Congress of the United States.

We must, therefore, acknowledge the fact that our naval vessels are today simply not capable of discharging their wartime mission requirements if called upon to do so.

I believe these facts are as close to proof positive as I can make available to the American people that if we are

not already a second-rate naval power, we are perilously close to becoming so. I need not emphasize that in a war with the Soviet Union there will be little solace in being in second place.

As sure as I stand before this House, there will be a confrontation in the Mediterranean between the Soviets and ourselves. They will create the incident to suit their convenience. And how will we respond? At the rate we are going now, considering the condition of the 6th Fleet, in fact the entire Atlantic Fleet, and the tremendous strides made by the Soviet naval forces, we would be forced to back down. Why do I say this? What did we do recently when a Russian trawler came within 200 yards of the nuclear submarine *James Madison*, off Cape Kennedy? We postponed the test launching of a Poseidon missile—and this is in our own backyard. Moreover, when we finally made the test launch of the Poseidon missile, the Russians literally moved into the test area and attempted to preempt our recovery of important fragments of the missile launch.

For years the Navy, in particular, has been accused of reporting Soviet submarines off our coasts just about the time the defense appropriation bill is debated on the floor. While these sightings have invariably turned out to be accurate, nevertheless those who oppose appropriations for the Navy always found it convenient to ridicule these intelligence reports which coincided with the consideration of appropriations for the Navy.

So now I would like to say to the doubting Thomases, if there are any remaining in the House, that if you would care to see for yourself a Soviet task force in the Caribbean, all you have to do is fly around the Caribbean area and you will see a *Kresta* class guided missile light cruiser, with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles; a *Kanin* class guided missile destroyer, with surface-to-air missiles; a Soviet tanker and a Soviet submarine tender. I need not tell you that a submarine tender tends submarines. There are three other Soviet surface vessels in the Caribbean area: an LST; a salvage ship and a rescue ocean tug.

For those of you who have scoffed at the constant warnings that have been issued by the House Committee on Armed Services with respect to the rise of Soviet seapower, let me remind you that the Soviets deployed combatant ships to the Caribbean area in July and August of 1969, and again in May of this year.

In 1969, the Soviet task force consisted of three guided missile ships—a cruiser, a frigate, and a destroyer—two attack submarines, one nuclear-powered attack submarine; a submarine tender, and two tankers.

In May of this year, the Soviets deployed a guided missile light cruiser, a guided missile destroyer, two attack submarines, a nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, a submarine tender and a merchant tanker.

All of these ships have conducted operations in the Caribbean area.

The deliberate and calculated offensive plans of the Soviet Union are now becoming crystal clear with the release of information by the administration of evidence of new Soviet activity in Cuba. I have no doubt that the Soviets are now building a missile-launching nuclear submarine naval base in Cuba.

We, as a nation and a free people, cannot ignore or accept this latest military action of the Soviet Union.

On October 23, 1962, President Kennedy issued a proclamation which reasserted the principle of the Monroe Doctrine as it applied to the Western Hemisphere and the introduction of nuclear weapons by a foreign power.

At that time, President Kennedy delivered an ultimatum to the Soviet Union to remove their nuclear offensive weapons capability from Cuba, or in the alternative such weapons would be removed forcibly by our military forces.

Regrettably, we are once again confronted with a crisis of the same gravity despite the waffled rhetoric which we may hear on the subject.

We cannot live with this new Soviet threat at our very doorstep.

We cannot permit the cities of the eastern seaboard to become hostages of the Soviet Union.

We must take every diplomatic, and if necessary military, step to excise this cancer from the body of the Western Hemisphere.

We must do it quickly and decisively if we are to maintain some shred of credibility as a world power—and the American people are willing to accept any action to accomplish this end.

You are eyewitnesses to the rise of Soviet seapower which is inexorably pushing us out of the Mediterranean, is firmly entrenched in the Indian Ocean, and is now established in the Caribbean.

And yet there may still be some among you who would deny additional funds to rebuild our Navy, which is fast becoming a second-rate naval power. The Soviets learned their lesson from the blockade that we threw around Cuba. Why is it that they have learned their lesson so well while our memories remain so short?

Mark my words well—one of these fine mornings we are going to be told by the Russians, in the most unmistakable terms, to get out of the Mediterranean.

In 1962 we had the power and the Soviet Union knew it, to reject such a challenge—I can tell you that today we do not have that superiority—the Soviets know it—and it is high time the American people know this bitter fact of life, and start worrying about its implications.

Do not be misled into believing we can make up for this frightening loss of naval superiority by relying upon a superior strategic nuclear capability, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Since 1965 the Soviet Union has engaged in a major effort to change the balance of power in this area of military capability. In that period it has more than tripled its inventory of strategic offensive nuclear weapon launchers from about 500 to 1,700, including some 200 nuclear heavy bombers in both.

In the same period, the United States has made no increase in its established

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level of 7,710 pounds. These heavy bombers, and has reduced its heavy bomber strength from 780 to less than 600.

In 1965, the Soviets had none of the monster SS-9 missiles operational. Today, the U.S.S.R. has more than 200 SS-9's operational, with an ultimate total of approximately 300 when current construction effort is completed.

Although the 300 SS-9's will represent considerably less than half of the total inventory of the Soviet land-based ICBM's, this portion of the Soviet ICBM inventory will alone be capable of delivering a megatonnage in nuclear weaponry which exceeds the combined total nuclear weapon megatonnage delivery capability of all of our existing strategic delivery systems, including not only our ICBM force, but our Polaris force, as well as our heavy bomber force. Certainly this fact alone ought to raise serious questions concerning the alleged "defensive" posture of the Soviet Union.

We have no counterpart for this huge Soviet nuclear weapon delivery system.

A few weeks ago an article appeared in a prominent weekly news magazine in which the writer dismissed U.S. concern over the SS-9 missile by saying that "comparison of the Soviet SS-9 and the U.S. Minuteman is misleading; they are different weapons systems designed for different purposes." The clear inference which the writer attempted to establish was that the Soviet SS-9 would only be used by the Soviets as a defensive missile against our Minuteman strike capability; whereas our Minuteman is designed to attack cities, and consequently this tremendous difference in the megatonnage of the two weapons really was unimportant.

It is this type of wishful thinking with which some of our so-called "civilian military experts" in the news media confuse the American public. The fundamental fact remains that the Russian options on utilization of their nuclear capability has been immeasurably increased by the addition of the SS-9 to their operational inventory. The real and deadly threat to U.S. security, therefore, remains regardless of how we may temporize or sugar coat this simple but unpalatable fact.

In 1965 neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had a depressed trajectory ICBM or a fractional orbital bombardment system—FOBS. Today, the Soviet Union has tested both, and could very well have operational versions of these weapons systems already deployed. Both of these developments have far-reaching implications on our defense capability.

Unfortunately, we have nothing like these, and to the best of my knowledge, none on our drawing boards.

Today the Soviets can launch over 200 ballistic missiles from their nuclear-powered submarines. Two years from now 400 to 500 of these Polaris-type missile launchers are expected to be operational, and by early 1974, this Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile force will inevitably exceed the constant U.S. force we now have of 656 Polaris launchers. Further, most of our major cities are

their potential submarine stations. Thus they can launch their attacks with little time for us to react before being hit.

Up to the present time, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have served to protect us from foreign attack. Today these very same oceans afford the Russians a ready means of surreptitiously bringing their missile launching submarines close to our cities from whence they can launch a deadly attack.

Our tactical air capability, when compared to the Soviet capability, also raises serious questions as to our ability to cope with the Soviet Union in a conventional confrontation. For example, since 1954 the Soviets have designed and produced 18 new types of fighter planes—13 of these models we have actually photographed in flight. In the same time frame, the United States has not produced a single new air superiority fighter, and actually we have not had one on order until this year.

Now, after an unforgivable delay, we have two fighters underway—the F-14 and the F-15, but they will not be a part of our inventory for several years.

We have dilly-dallied for years until the Soviets now have an air superiority capability which we will be hard pressed to match. Yet, there are those in and out of Congress who would stop the production of our F-14's and F-15's.

The Soviet Union has at least three VSTOL fighter aircraft that have flown successfully. These are aircraft with a vertical and short takeoff capability. We are just now in the process of acquiring some Harriers which will give us this VSTOL capability. The Harrier is the only operational aircraft of its type in the free world.

Yet, there are those who would create roadblocks for the purchase of these aircraft, one group opposing their procurement on the theory that it is a British aircraft, and the other opposed on the grounds that it will be manufactured in the United States at a higher price than it could be purchased from the British. Obviously, we cannot please everyone.

And yet, procurement of this aircraft is essential if we are going to revolutionize naval air operations in the years ahead.

There are only two areas in our whole national security program in which we may have a superiority as yet unchallenged. We are the only Nation that is building attack aircraft carriers. So the argument is made that since the Soviets do not have carriers we should not build any more or we should lay up those that we have.

To some, it is a crime for the United States to be ahead of the Soviets in any area.

Then, there is the Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle—MIRV. We are now deploying the MIRV and in this area we appear to be ahead of the Soviets. For this very reason, there are those who would eliminate any further deployment of MIRV's and even remove those already deployed. The rationale is that this would appease the Soviets and would lead them to the conclusion that we have no aggressive plans.

Reasoning is being propagandized throughout the United States, the Soviets continue to increase their deployment of the most powerful ICBM ever constructed, the SS-9.

I say to this House that the future of this Nation hangs by a thread.

We are in a far more serious situation than many would have you believe. Our way of life is not only being challenged from within, it is being very definitely threatened from without.

Yet, sincere, conscientious people of good will will look you straight in the eye and say, "We must solve all of our domestic problems with the money we are using for national defense because we are really not threatened from without, or the threat from without is far less serious than the threat from within."

Scoff if you will; laugh if you wish, but it is your children and grandchildren who will pay the penalty for your timidity or your naivete.

You may well ask "Why, with a defense budget in recent years which has exceeded \$70 billion do we find ourselves in this position with the Soviet Union?" The answer, very simply stated, is that the Soviet Union is spending relatively more on its military effort than we are.

Let me give you some of the facts:

In 1955 defense-related research and development effort in the United States was \$3 billion; within the U.S.S.R. it was \$2 billion.

In 1960, the United States spent \$7 billion; the U.S.S.R. spent \$5 billion.

In 1965, the United States spent \$13 billion; the U.S.S.R. \$10 billion.

In 1968, the United States spent \$14 billion; the U.S.S.R. \$14 billion.

In 1969, the United States spent \$14 billion; the U.S.S.R. \$15 billion.

In 1970, the United States will have spent \$13 to \$14 billion, while the U.S.S.R. will have spent \$16 to \$17 billion.

These figures in the R. & D. area alone reflect Soviet determination to match and pass the United States in the incorporation of advanced technology into military hardware.

Despite the increased effort expended by the Soviet Union in defense-related R. & D., there has been no corresponding reduction in the resources the Soviet Union has allocated toward the R. & D. effort in the civil industrial base.

Thus, contrary to the effort in the United States of reducing the Defense Department's R. & D. effort and allocating it to civilian agencies, the Soviet Union continues to fund both efforts at progressively increasing levels.

The significance of the greater R. & D. effort being made in the Soviet Union is that technological advances developed by this greater R. & D. effort will only be evident 4, 5, and 10 years from now, but at a time when we will be incapable of catching up to match these technological improvements and advancements.

Stated another way, if we permit the Soviet Union to create hardware which will negate our existing technological capability in offensive and defensive weapons, the Soviets will so extend us in power as to preempt any possible influence we

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may in the future hope to exert among the family of nations.

The determination in our military capability as contrasted to that of the Soviet Union has resulted from a combination of the Vietnam war, inflation, and the pressures of new and increased costs of our domestic programs.

In order to place this matter in better perspective, let me provide you with a few facts on this matter:

Since fiscal year 1968 the Department of Defense has attempted to combat inflationary forces with DOD reductions, totaling \$17.3 billion in constant dollars.

In this same period, a reordering of national priorities has resulted in a reallocation of Federal resources from defense to other programs in amounts greater than the DOD reductions.

The fiscal year 1971 defense program in constant dollars is only \$5 billion above the prewar fiscal year 1964 level. Yet, the incremental cost of the war in fiscal year 1971 is undoubtedly more than double the \$5 billion budget increase. Thus, what has occurred is that the difference in funding of the Vietnam war has been accomplished by deferring weapons modernization, plant maintenance, and by reductions in operational readiness.

The impact on these factors is actually greater than these figures indicate since with inflation and a combination of pay and price increases, personnel costs have increased tremendously, wiping out even the most intensive economies achieved by the Defense Establishment.

For example, in 1965 with a military manpower level at 2.6 million, military pay cost \$13.9 billion.

Under today's higher costs and with projected pay increases, if we had 2.6 million men in fiscal year 1971 and we now have in excess of 3 million, the personnel costs for fiscal year 1971 would be approximately \$29 billion. Thus, personnel costs alone will have more than doubled since 1965, without regard to manpower levels. This gives one an idea of how severely manpower costs and the effort to reduce defense costs have detracted from our ability to maintain a modern technologically advanced military capability.

Let me hasten to add that these military pay increases which have been and will continue to be provided by the Congress are absolutely necessary. Moreover, additional compensation increases will, in the future, be necessary if we hope to reduce reliance on the draft, or keep any semblance of a career force which is absolutely essential as our weapons systems become more and more complex.

In terms of gross national product, our defense budget has gone from 9.7 percent in 1968 to 7 percent in 1971, while at the same time the domestic parts of our national budget have increased their share of the gross national product from 12.2 percent to well over 13.4 percent in the same time frame.

The 7 percent portion of the gross national product which is allocated to our national defense represents the smallest allocation of our gross national product to national defense purposes in 20 years. Surely no American would argue that we can put a price tag on the lives of our

people. I would rather be alive at 10 percent than dead at 7.

Now let me summarize for a moment. I have outlined to you that our former 5-to-1 margin in nuclear strategic weapons has in a few short years vanished. The Soviet Union now has a nuclear strategic weapon capability in excess of ours, and this superiority will continue to increase if we do not take dramatic action to stem the tide. We can no longer look upon our threat of nuclear war as a satisfactory deterrent to aggression with conventional arms, as we could in the two decades past. From here on if we threaten nuclear war in response to aggression, we risk our own destruction.

Moreover, I pointed out that the Soviet Union has within a few short years negated our naval superiority. This same accomplishment is evident in other areas of conventional warfare, including our ground and air capabilities.

As a matter of fact, while Congress is still debating the necessity for building an advanced manned strategic bomber, the B-1, we now know that the Soviet Union has already built such an aircraft, and it should be coming into their operational inventory at least 3 to 4 years before we can hope to have our B-1 operational.

The circumstances of the B-1 bomber debate in this country illustrate the reasons why we seem hell-bent on national suicide. While we debate the question of maintaining our military capability, the Soviet Union quietly but openly forges ahead.

It may be that the gap which has now been created in our defense capability can never be bridged. The Soviets have the bit in their teeth, and make no mistake about it, are both capable and determined to maintain this newly developed superiority.

Perhaps I can best put into perspective the determined accelerated effort being made by the Soviet Union to eclipse the United States in strategic capability, both offensive and defensive, by giving you a concrete measure of this effort.

In calendar year 1969, the United States spent a total of \$7.5 billion on strategic offensive and defensive weaponry. During that same period, the Soviet Union expended approximately \$13 billion for the same effort. Thus, it is evident that the Soviet Union in a single calendar year has spent approximately \$5.5 billion more for increased strategic capability than did the United States.

I recognize that a \$5.5 billion added effort is somewhat difficult for laymen to comprehend. However, since the cost of a single Minuteman missile is approximately \$4.8 million, the added Soviet effort is roughly equivalent to the procurement of a thousand Minuteman missiles.

All of this in one calendar year.

Can anyone consider this anything but an obvious effort to give the Soviet Union an insurmountable advantage in strategic weaponry over the United States before the conclusion of the SALT talks?

As a matter of fact, this circumstance alone illustrates the cold and calculating master plan of the Soviet Union, who in entering the SALT negotiations hope to freeze the United States in an inferior position in strategic weaponry.

I pray to God that the American people,

and the Congress in particular, will soon awaken to these realities and recognize that the question confronting us is no longer one involving the relative allocation of priorities in spending between defense and domestic programs, but rather the fundamental question of national survival.

We cannot as a Nation afford to spend one penny less on national defense than that amount which is required to insure that you and I, and our children, can convince the Soviets they dare not pull the trigger when a Soviet gun is placed against our heads.

The issue, therefore, is very simply how much money must we spend to insure our survival—since if we fail to demonstrate to the Soviet Union our determination to survive—the amount of money we spend for domestic programs will become merely an academic exercise.


I plead, and I beg you, my colleagues who collectively have the responsibility of the security of our Nation in your hands, to ponder these facts which I have brought to you today. They are proof positive that we are in serious trouble. Unpleasant as these facts may be, you can not ignore them, for if you do, you are failing not only your constituency but also all the peoples of the world who, in the final analysis, look upon the United States as the fountainhead and guardian of the highest aspiration of genuine freedom in this chaotic world.

These are the facts that confront our President, our Congress, and our defense planners.

These are the facts which reflect the prophetic wisdom of an observation once made by a gentleman by the name of Mr. Richard M. Nixon, when he said:

If present trends continue, the United States, a very few years hence, will find itself clearly in second position—with the Soviet Union undisputedly the greatest military power on earth.

I am afraid that that day has already arrived.



Washington, Sept. 30(Reuters) -- A House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Chairman said today it was hard to pinpoint whether the Soviet Union was in fact establishing a submarine base in Cuba as indicated by the Pentagon.

Rep. Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla., Chairman of the House of Representatives Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee, spoke with reporters after his panel heard closed-door testimony from two Defense Department experts on Soviet affairs.

The hearing was prompted by the Pentagon disclosure Friday of indications Moscow was setting up a submarine base at Cienfuegos Harbour on the South Coast of Cuba.

The White House warned that the Russians faced another Cuban Missile Crisis if the Cuban facility was used to introduce strategic weapons in the Caribbean.

Meanwhile, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin Wednesday declined with a smile to comment on the question of a Soviet naval base in Cuba.

In Moscow, the first Soviet press comment on the charges came when Pravda Wednesday charged that Washington "thoughtlessly fabricates hollow-sounding propaganda campaigns without thinking about their consequences."

(The Communist Party daily did not specifically mention the U.S. charge about Cuba but it was clearly referring to this.)

Fascell said that the use of the Cienfuegos Harbour by Soviet naval ships -- the Pentagon reported a submarine tender and three barges were in the port last week -- made the potential for establishing a submarine base more specific.

Asked whether any submarines had used the facility, he replied that "the point is the Soviets are operating naval units in the Caribbean and once they start that they are going to keep it up."

Fascell urged stationing more planes at Boca Chica Air Base and nuclear submarines at Key West, Fla.

"It seems inconceivable to me at the very time the Soviets are increasing their presence and improving their capability to operate in the Caribbean that we are reducing our capability in the Southeast, particularly in Florida."

UPI-142

(MISSILES)

WASHINGTON--SEN. FRANK CHURCH, D-IDAH, SAID TODAY THAT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS PRESENTED TO THE SENATE DO NOT SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BUILDING A MISSILE BASE IN CUBA.

"I THINK THE PRESENT EVIDENCE WOULD NOT SUSTAIN A REASONABLE CONCLUSION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER," CHURCH SAID AFTER A TWO-HOUR INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.

"THERE IS CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY GOING ON, BUT I MUST SAY SOME OF THE STORIES THAT HAVE BEEN CIRCULATED MADE A VERY BIG MOUNTAIN OUT OF WHAT AT PRESENT IS A MOLEHILL ...

"EVEN THE FACT THAT IT IS A RUSSIAN FACILITY IS SUBJECT TO QUESTION."

CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, INVITED THE ENTIRE SENATE TO A CLOSED-DOOR BRIEFING BY THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. HE SAID ABOUT 10 SENATORS ATTENDED.

THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED LAST WEEK THAT IT HAD EVIDENCE INDICATING THE RUSSIANS WERE BUILDING A NAVAL FACILITY IN CUBA AND ISSUED A STERN WARNING TO THE U.S.S.R.


HE SAID HE WAS NOT CRITICIZING THE ADMINISTRATION FOR ITS ANNOUNCEMENT BUT WAS PUZZLED BY IT.

"I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY ANYONE AT THE WHITE HOUSE APPARENTLY ATTACHED SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THIS EVIDENCE," HE SAID. "THERE MAY HAVE BEEN OTHER REASONS, PERHAPS ASSOCIATED WITH SOVIET ACTIVITY ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, THAT PROMPTED THE STATEMENT."

ACCORDING TO CHURCH AND TO SEN. CLIFFORD P. CASE, R-N.J., WHO ALSO ATTENDED THE BRIEFING, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT CONSTRUCTION IS UNDERWAY ON THE CUBAN SHORE. BUT THEY SAID IT IS "IMPOSSIBLE" TO CONCLUDE WHAT IS BEING BUILT OR WHO IS BUILDING IT.

"IT IS NOT A CRISIS AT ALL ON THE BASIS OF OUR EVIDENCE," CHURCH SAID. "BUT THE LAST TIME THIS KIND OF THING HAPPENED IT TOOK THE WORLD TO THE VERGE OF A NUCLEAR WAR. SO WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL."

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WASHINGTON--THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY IT HAS EVIDENCE THAT RUSSIA HAS STARTED CONSTRUCTION OF A SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. 

ASKED IF THE BASE MIGHT BE INTENDED TO SUPPORT MISSILE-CARRYING SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINES STATIONED IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, A SPOKESMAN SAID: "WE CAN'T RULE OUT THAT POSSIBILITY."

THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE BY JERRY W. FRIEDHEIM, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

"WE KNOW THAT THE ACTIVITY IS IN PROGRESS," HE SAID. "WE CANNOT ASSESS THE SOVIET INTENTION."

THE "ACTIVITY" HAS INCLUDED TOWING THREE HEAVY BARGES INTO THE HARBOR AT CIEN FUEGOS, WHERE IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE BASE IS BEING BUILT.

ASKED IF THE BARGES COULD BE ASSEMBLED INTO A FLOATING DRY-DOCK, FRIEDHEIM SAID: "WE KNOW WHAT THE BARGES ARE, BUT I AM NOT AT LIBERTY TO TELL YOU."

HE SAID THERE ARE CURRENTLY FOUR SOVIET SHIPS, INCLUDING A SUBMARINE TENDER, IN THE HARBOR AT CIEN FUEGOS. SEVERAL OTHER SOVIET SHIPS ARE IN THE GENERAL AREA.

AFTER THE UNITED STATES STATIONED MISSILE-CARRYING SUBMARINES IN EUROPEAN WATERS, BASES TO SUPPORT THE SUBS WERE ESTABLISHED AT HOLY LOCH, ENGLAND, AND LATER AT ROTA, SPAIN.

THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE DOING THE SAME THING IN THIS HEMISPHERE. THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED THURSDAY THAT THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE 13 NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES, CARRYING 16 MISSILES EACH, AND THAT 15 MORE SUBS OF THE SAME CLASS ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

THE DISTANT BASES ARE NEEDED TO SERVICE THE SUBS WITHOUT FORCING THEM TO CROSS THE OCEAN FOR EACH REPAIR.

FRIEDHEIM SAID THE THREE BARGES WERE BROUGHT ACROSS THE ATLANTIC ON THE DECK OF A SOVIET LSD (LANDING SHIP DOCK) TYPE OF VESSEL, AND WERE PROBABLY OFF-LOADED AT HAVANA.

HE SAID THEY WERE SPOTTED AND IDENTIFIED WHILE BEING TOWED AROUND THE WEST END OF CUBA.

THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT CIENFUEGOS POSSIBLY DID NOT HAVE THE CRANES OR OTHER MACHINERY OR FACILITIES NEEDED FOR THE UNLOADING.

ASKED HOW THE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED, FRIEDHEIM SAID THE U.S. IS STILL CONDUCTING U-2 INTELLIGENCE FLIGHTS OVER CUBA. HE REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES: "WE KNOW THERE IS ACTIVITY; WE DON'T KNOW YET WHETHER IT'S A BASE."

HE ALSO SAID: "WE ARE KEEPING THE ACTIVITY UNDER CAREFUL SURVEILLANCE."

ASSISTANT DEFENSE SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS DANIEL A. HENKIN SAID EARLIER IN THE WEEK THAT THE SOVIETS "APPARENTLY ARE SEEKING A CAPABILITY FOR SUSTAINED SURFACE AND SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN CLOSE BY OUR SHORES."

THE SOVIET NAVAL TASK FORCE NOW IN CUBAN WATERS IS THE FOURTH TO ENTER THE CARIBBEAN AREA IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. THERE WERE TWO VISITS IN 1969, AND ONE EARLIER THIS YEAR.

IN ADDITION, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL LONG-RANGE PLANE FLIGHTS FROM RUSSIA TO CUBA DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS.

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